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Abstract
We study a Danish reform in 2002 that lowered the ex ante probability of refugees receiving
permanent residency by prolonging the time period before they were eligible to apply for per-
manent residency. Assignment to the new rules was completely determined by the date of the
asylum application and the reform was implemented retroactively. We formulate a simple search
and matching model to derive predictions that can be tested using our data. Then we study
the effects on educational and labor market outcomes and find that the reform significantly
increased enrollment in formal education, especially for females and low skilled individuals. In
terms of employment and earnings, coefficients are in general negative but non-significant. Other
outcomes of interest are also studied. The reform had a negative impact on criminal activity
driven by a reduction among males. There are no effects on health outcomes and significant
but relatively small negative effects on childbearing for females. The results do not seem to
be driven by selection, since the reform had no significant effect on the share that stayed in
Denmark in the long run.
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Recent developments around the world have led to a large inflow of asylum seekers to Europe. In
response to the increased numbers of asylum seekers, many European countries have implemented
stricter immigration policies. The motivation has been to reduce immigration and/or improve inte-
gration of immigrants granted residency. One such policy is the shift from permanent to temporary
residence permits for refugees.1 Although several countries have, or are about to, implement such
reforms, we do not have any empirical evidence on their effects on refugees’ integration in society
in general and on the labor market in particular. A priori, it is possible to think that a shift to
temporary permits could have both positive and negative effects on integration in society and on
the labor market. On the one hand, the expected return to investment in country specific human
capital falls if the probability of receiving permanent residency falls. On the other hand, actions
that lead to labor market attachment during the time with temporary residency are incentivised
when they increase the probability for permanent residency.
In the public debate, stronger incentives for labor market investments in the host country have
been put forward as an argument in favor of temporary permits. Proponents argue that this policy
will strengthen incentives to integrate. At the same time, opponents have highlighted the cost of
increased stress from a lower probability of being granted permanent residency, and a decrease in
expected returns to investments in country specific human capital. Because we still know very little
about the impact of this type of policy it is important to try to understand its effects. Specifically,
we want to address the following question: what are the effects of changes to the probability of
being granted permanent residency? Because of the potentially counteracting effects discussed
above, this is ultimately an empirical question which remains to be answered. Furthermore, while
immigrants’ entrance to the labor market is relatively well studied, less attention has been given to
the specific challenges of those given refuge in a new country. In fact, we know very little about the
integration process of refugees and their labor market prospects. In a recent paper, Fasani et al.
(2018) show that refugees have worse labor market outcomes compared to other immigrants across
European countries. This calls for more research focusing on refugee immigration to Europe, with
a focus on immigrants’ outcomes.
In this paper we study the effects of a Danish reform, implemented in 2002 as part of a reform
package, that changed the eligibility requirements for permanent residency, thereby lowering the ex
ante probability of being granted a permanent residence permit. This was done by increasing the
length of the time period a refugee would have had to be a legal resident (on temporary residence
permits) in Denmark before being eligible to apply for permanent residency. During the time with
temporary status a residence permit could be withdrawn if the grounds for protection were no
longer valid, and if the individual did not have the right to stay based on other grounds, such as for
1For example, in July 2016 Sweden introduced a temporary law shifting from permanent to temporary residence
permits and limiting access to family reunification. Among several other changes to refugee policy, in December 2014
Australia reintroduced temporary protection visas - that cannot be changed into permanent status - for those who
arrive without a valid visa.
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example through labor market attachment. The way that this reform component was implemented
allows us to distinguish the effect of a longer temporary period from other reform components, as
the change we are studying was the only one implemented retroactively. The change applied to
individuals who lodged their first asylum application on or after February 28, 2002. This meant that
refugees who applied for asylum from February 28, 2002 and onward faced a longer time period
with temporary status, during which they risked losing the grounds for protection, before they
could apply for permanent residency. All else equal, the ex ante probability of receiving permanent
residency in Denmark on the grounds of asylum was thus higher prior to the reform.2 We study
the reform in a regression discontinuity in time setting. Register data allows us to track individuals
granted asylum and observe a large set of outcomes over time. Thus, we are able to empirically dig
deeper into the mechanisms at work and to consider the impact of the reform on different subgroups
of refugees. We are interested in the behavioral responses to this reform component, and our focus
is on outcomes that are relevant for integration and/or the assessment of grounds for prolonged
residency, and that the individual could affect herself. Our main outcomes are therefore in terms
of educational investments and status on the labor market. Labor market attachment can in itself
be viewed as a measure of integration, whereas education can be considered as an investment in
integration. We study the full sample as well as sample splits based on gender and skill level (high
skill denotes individuals with university education while low skill is below university education).
Our results suggest that lowering the ex ante probability of receiving permanent residency
increased enrollment in education by 17 percentage points at the cutoff point. Enrollment is
measured as the share that is ever enrolled in education (not including Danish courses) during
the first twelve years of residency in Denmark. We also show higher enrollment rates for the
treatment group throughout the twelve years by plotting enrollment rates over time. The increase
in enrollment is mainly driven by females and low skilled individuals. The effect for females is
an increase of around 21–27 percentage points at the cutoff. We interpret the positive effect on
enrollment in education as an increased investment in human capital and integration. To understand
the impact of this increase we consider several other educational outcomes. We find no significant
effects on enrolling in labor market training or adult education, on the propensity to complete an
education or the number of years in education. In terms of labor market outcomes we focus on
the share of individuals that are ever employed (or self-employed) during the first twelve years in
Denmark, and on their earnings measured three and seven years after arrival. We do not estimate
any significant effects on labor market outcomes but the coefficients are negative and, if anything,
suggest a negative impact of the reform in the long run. This is also true when we look at earnings
conditional on employment. There is no change in the number of times individuals change jobs,
2This, however, does not mean that the reform necessarily changed whether an individual got to stay in Denmark
or not. In fact, we show that around 90 percent of individuals (in both the control and treatment group) are still in
Denmark twelve years after their first arrival. The individual could (1) have had asylum reasons throughout the time
period with temporary permits, or (2) established a labor market attachment which could be used as grounds for
prolonged temporary residency. Although a refugee had no control over the development in their home country, or
the Danish authorities’ assessment of whether grounds for asylum were still valid, they could affect their attachment
to the labor market and thus affect the probability of staying in Denmark.
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but for high skilled individuals we do find a marginally significant negative effect on the highest
skill level ever achieved on a job. One potential explanation for this could be if high skilled accept
jobs they are over-qualified for, or if employers are reluctant to invest in high skilled workers with
a more uncertain future in Denmark.
There are other outcomes of interest in this context. We study whether the reform had any
effect on criminal activity, health or fertility behavior. Engaging in criminal activity could be seen
as an alternative to entering the regular labor market, but criminal activities also make it harder
to get permanent residency after the reform. Increased uncertainty from a lower probability of
permanent residency may also have a direct effect on an individual’s health, which in turn could
affect future labor market outcomes. In terms of fertility, the reform and the implied increase in
uncertainty may have affected the willingness to bring children into the world. Finally, we are
interested in asylum holders’ duration in Denmark, for two reasons. First, the reform could have
affected the willingness and ability to stay in Denmark as the prerequisites to stay changed, which
in itself is an interesting outcome. Second, if the fraction staying in Denmark changed, results on
other outcomes may be driven by this selection rather than by behavioral responses among those
staying in Denmark. We find a negative effect on conviction rates for property crimes during the
first twelve years in Denmark of around 10 percentage points. This decrease is concentrated among
males. We find no significant differences between the two groups in terms of health, fertility or the
share that is still in Denmark twelve years after their first asylum application. The latter finding
suggests that any effects we pick up are unlikely to be due to an indirect effect - operating through
selection - that would occur if some group was more likely than another to stay in Denmark.
To further understand the mechanisms at work we set up a theoretical search and matching
model, to derive predictions that can be compared to our empirical findings. This model focuses
on labor market outcomes and includes heterogeneity in terms of productivity - with high and
low skilled agents - as well as a human capital investment decision. We use the model to study
education and labor market outcomes under different assumptions about the impact of the reform.
In particular, the empirical findings on education are in line with the implications from our theo-
retical setting where low skilled individuals are, ex ante, more negatively affected by the reform.
Empirically we think that this group consists of individuals further away from the labor market.
In the model this is true regardless of whether they are employed or unemployed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the related
literature and Section 3 describes the institutional settings in Denmark and the reform that we are
studying. Section 4 presents a theoretical framework to analyze the potential effects, while Section
5 describes the empirical strategy, as well as the data and the identification strategy. In Section 6
we present our main results and robustness checks are performed in Section 7. Section 8 presents
data and results on other outcomes, while Section 9 concludes.
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2 Related literature
There is to our knowledge no other paper that specifically studies the long-run effects on refugees of
a prolonged temporary status. Changes to immigration policy are particularly difficult to evaluate
due to difficulties in finding a valid comparison group. Previously, some studies have compared
different types of immigrants to assess the importance of, for example, the time horizon in the host
country. As different types of immigrant may differ in important ways we would preferably like to
study the effects within one specific group of immigrants. At the same time, even when looking
at one type of immigrants (for example refugees) there may be substantial heterogeneity. It is
well known that the characteristics of refugees from a given country can change over time. All of
this implies that estimating the effects of changes to the probability of being granted permanent
residency is challenging.
There are related studies that consider the difference between temporary and permanent
migration spells in other contexts. For example, Chen et al. (2016) study the selection into
temporary or permanent migration. Temporary, short-term, migration is typically a response
to fluctuations in the local labor market, while long-term migration is more stable. They show
that long-term migrants are more strongly positively selected and relate this to higher returns
to matching. Cortes (2004) analyzes heterogeneity between refugees and economic immigrants in
terms of their time horizons. Assuming that refugees cannot return to their country of origin, and
thus face a longer time horizon, they have stronger incentives to invest in country-specific human
capital. Her study is related to, and theoretically builds on, Duleep & Regets (1999) and their
model on human capital accumulation. Furthermore, Orrenius & Zavodny (2015) study the effects
on labor market outcomes of granting specific groups of immigrants temporary protected status
(TPS) in the United States, and show that, in general, it appears that even having a temporary
permit - compared to illegal status - improves labor market opportunities for immigrants. In Cortes
(2004) and Orrenius & Zavodny (2015), a distinction is made between immigrants with different
time horizons (refugees vs. economic immigrants) and between immigrants with different legal
status. One benefit of our setup is that we can look at the importance of the time horizon and
status in the host country within one group of immigrants, refugees. Arguably, refugees are likely
to be different in many aspects compared to for example economic immigrants, and, since they
constitute a more marginalized group in relation to the labor market, it is important to understand
the effects of changing conditions for them specifically.
Several papers study immigration and crime and how policy matters in this context. In a
recent paper, Pinotti (2017) uses a regression discontinuity design to show that immigrant legaliza-
tion reduces crime rates among immigrants in Italy. The proposed mechanism is that legalization
increases the opportunity cost of crime by improving access to the regular labor market. Mas-
trobuoni & Pinotti (2015) find a reduction in crime following the European Union enlargement.
Baker (2015) also finds a negative effect on crime from legalization of undocumented immigrants
in the United States. In Lozano & Sørensen (2011), the authors study the effect of legalization
on earnings among Mexican immigrants in the United States, and find an increase in occupational
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wages. They interpret their findings as support of immigrants finding better jobs following le-
galization. Fasani (2016) finds small and non-persistent reductions in crime following a wave of
amnesty programs in Italy. Furthermore, Fasani (2015) highlights the importance of policy design
in shaping effects of legalization on crime. Considering a different type of outcome, Dustmann
et al. (2017) study consumption effects of legalization. They show that undocumented immigrants
consume less than documented immigrants, and argue that this is because of lower income. More
closely related to the outcomes studied in this paper, Devillanova et al. (2014) study employment
effects of legalization following an amnesty program in Italy and find positive effects of prospective
legal status on employment probability. Legalization policies are clearly important to study, but
they are conceptually different to policies of permanent or temporary residence permits. It is not
necessarily the case that findings from the legalization literature translate to other types of policy
changes, such as the one we study.
Another closely related paper in terms of the type of policy studied is Blomqvist et al.
(2018). They study the short-run effects, over a one-year horizon, of restricting access to permanent
residency in Sweden and find some evidence of a higher probability of enrolling in basic Swedish
education. Finally, Mansouri et al. (2010) provide a comparative study of temporary permit
regimes in Denmark, Germany and Australia. Through interviews with NGOs they conclude that
introducing temporary residence permits, or prolonging the temporary status, increased uncertainty
for refugees and suggest that integration has been made more difficult as a result. A key advantage
of our study is that we are able to quantify the response to prolonged temporary status and that
we can study the mechanisms through which refugees were affected.
There are several relevant papers using Danish data to study immigrants’ outcomes. Clausen
et al. (2009) analyze the effects on labor market integration for immigrants from Danish active
labor market programs (ALMPs). They find mixed effects depending on the type of program, but in
general positive effects from language training and participation in wage subsidy programs.3 Other
aspects of the 2002 reform package in Denmark have also been studied. There were several aspects to
the general reform package; notably limiting access to the welfare state and to family reunification.
Huynh et al. (2007) study the employment effects of limiting access to the welfare state, finding
positive employment effects from reduced benefits. The authors exploit the discontinuity that arises
from the fact that only those granted asylum after July 1, 2002 were subject to the new benefit
rules. Similarly, Rosholm & Vejlin (2010) analyze the effects of lowering benefits on both job finding
and job separation rates. Rather than using a regression discontinuity approach they implement a
mixed proportional hazard model. In line with the evidence from Huynh et al. (2007) the authors
find small positive effects on the job finding rate. In this paper we instead study another part of
the reform package to shed light on the effects of lower ex ante probability of receiving permanent
residence.




Denmark has seen the number of asylum applicants vary a lot over the years. 2001 denoted a peak
in the number of asylum seekers, and between 2001 and 2002 the number of asylum seekers was
cut in half to 6,068 from 12,512, with most of the asylum seekers arriving from Afghanistan, Iraq
and Former Republic of Yugoslavia. This is the time period of immediate interest for us, and as
we will see in Section 3.1 it is a time period of substantial change in terms of asylum policies.
The process of applying for asylum in Denmark is governed by the Aliens Act and the decisions
are made by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS), while appeals are handled by the Refugee
Appeals Board.4 The process of applying for asylum in Denmark and the different types of permits
are described in more detail in Appendix A.
3.1 The 2002 reform package
On November 27, 2001, a new minority centre-right-wing coalition government was appointed
in Denmark. This shift of government reflected a shift in public opinion on immigration (see
for example Mansouri et al. (2010)). The new government introduced a number of legislative
changes regarding asylum and immigration policies that were passed by the Danish parliament
as amendments to the Aliens Act and the Integration Act. We will study the effects of a reform
component that changed the criteria for eligibility for permanent residency in Denmark (henceforth
referred to as the reform). This change was part of a suggestion for a new Bill to amend the Danish
Integration Act, presented by the new government in February 2002 (Ersbøll & Gravesen, 2010).
The Bill was passed by the Danish parliament (Folketinget) on June 6 2002.5 The explicit aim of
this reform package was to limit the number of asylum seekers to Denmark, while still respecting
international obligations, and speed up the integration process (The Danish Immigration Service,
2003).
Both prior to and post the reform, individuals given asylum were initially granted a temporary
residence permit if protection was deemed necessary. During the temporary status, the residence
permit could be discontinued if the grounds for residency were no longer valid. Generally, temporary
protection would remain valid if the need for protection remained and there were no legal reasons
to withdraw it.6 Refugees could also be allowed to remain on a temporary residence permit based
on labor market attachment, even if there was no longer any need for protection. After a certain
time period as a resident in Denmark, a refugee (above 18 years old) would be eligible to apply for
permanent residency.
The main change to the eligibility to apply for permanent residency was the change in how
4Individuals granted asylum for humanitarian reasons are an exception, and in these cases the Ministry for
Foreigners, Integration and Housing (in 2002, the Ministry for Integration) makes the decision. If an asylum seeker’s
application is rejected, he/she can still be given asylum for humanitarian reasons.
5Discussions began in January when a new aliens policy was introduced, and this gave rise to the suggested Bill
to amend the Integration Act in February. The Bill that was eventually adopted implied changes to the Aliens Act
as well. Bill no. L 152 entered into force as Act no. 365 of June 6 2002.
6Paragraph 11 in the Aliens Act.
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long one would have had to be a legal resident in Denmark on a temporary residence permit. Prior
to the reform, three years was sufficient, whereas after the reform a refugee would have to wait
for seven years until able to apply for a permanent residence permit.7 This change implied that
individuals subject to the new rules would have to live with temporary protection for a longer time
period, facing the risk of having their permit discontinued. Once eligible to apply for permanent
residency, refugees would be granted permanent residence if the need for protection remained or if
they had a labor market attachment (given fulfillment of some supplementary conditions), unless
there were legal reasons to withdraw the residence permit. Prior to the reform, these conditions
included completing an integration program and having limited public debt. Under the new rules,
in addition to completing the integration course, asylum seekers would now have to pass a language
test and have no overdue public debt. In addition, while a criminal record would previously lead to
longer waiting time, a serious criminal record would after the reform prevent permanent residency
(Ersbøll & Gravesen, 2010). In total this means that getting permanent residency was made more
difficult by the reform.
In addition to the changes in requirements for being eligible to apply for permanent residency,
the 2002 reform package also lowered benefit levels, made family reunification more difficult, abol-
ished the de facto status and the possibility to apply for asylum at Danish embassies abroad. We
are able to isolate the effect of changes to the eligibility for permanent residency from other parts
of the reform package. This was the only component introduced retroactively and it applied to all
individuals who lodged their asylum application on or after February 28, 2002 (the date on which
the new Bill was proposed). The other components of the reform package took effect after the
Bill was passed, on July 1, 2002. For more details about the other components of the reform, see
Appendix B.
Another potentially important reform came in 2003, allowing immigrants that had lodged
their applications on or after February 28, 2002 to apply for permanent residency already after
five years if they were ”well integrated”, i.e. if they had strong labor market attachment and had
not relied on social welfare.8 Furthermore, in case of exceptional reasons in terms of successful
integration, it was possible to receive a permanent permit also after three years of legal residency
(Ersbøll & Gravesen, 2010). What this implies for our analysis is that the integration motive was
made stronger.9
The key take away from the policy change introduced by Act no. 365 of June 6 2002, for our
7Formally, the reform implied that if the refugee had held a legal permit on the basis of paragraph 7–9 of the
Aliens Act for at least seven years, counting from the date of approval of the temporary permit, he/she was eligible
to apply for permanent residency. Paragraphs 7–9 included permits for all the categories of refugees that we consider,
and, in particular, paragraph 9 included specific permits based on labor market attachment.
8This was an addition to paragraph 11 in the Aliens Act, entered into force as Act no. 425 of June 10 2003, and
the formal requirement implies that the applicant should have lived legally in Denmark for at least five years and
have been self-supporting with a solid labor market attachment for the last three years.
9During 2002 there were some other important changes to decision practices for specific refugee groups. These
are unrelated to the policy changes studied in this paper, but they are relevant to highlight since they affected the
approval rates for specific nationalities. In particular, changes applied to asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iraq and
Kosovo, for whom, following a reassessment of the security situations, requirements for asylum were made stricter.
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analysis, is that it implied a lower ex ante probability of being granted permanent residency based
on asylum reasons. At the same time, following this reform there was still the possibility of getting
permanent residency through labor market attachment, and one potential effect is that this option
became more important. In terms of this incentive we think that different groups of refugees may
have been differentially affected. In particular, we do not think that all groups face the same labor
market prospects, and therefore the option of securing residency through labor market attachment
will be more realistic for some groups than others. The types of differences we will focus on in the
empirical analysis are in terms of gender and skill levels.
4 Theoretical framework
Changes to the probability of being granted permanent residency in Denmark could affect labor
market and education investments in the host country in two opposite directions. On the one
hand, an ex ante lower probability of permanent residency based on asylum reasons could increase
incentives to qualify for permanent residency based on labor market attachment, and thus increase
investments in country specific human capital. Such investments could for example be getting an
education. If this was the case, we would expect to see positive effects on educational and/or
labor market outcomes. On the other hand, with a lower probability of staying in the long run,
the expected payoff to country specific investments is lower. The lower probability could in this
case deter asylum seekers and we would expect to see negative effects on educational and/or labor
market outcomes. A key argument in favor of temporary protection is the idea of its positive effects
on integration. This claim is, however, clearly subject to verification because of the potentially
counteracting effects. To shed light on this question we set up a search and matching model, that
includes a choice of whether or not to invest in human capital, to derive predictions that can be
tested in our empirical setting.10
The theoretical model aims to provide a framework that can facilitate the interpretation of
our empirical results. Specifically, it can help to understand potential transmission mechanisms of
a policy change such as the one studied here. The model is intentionally kept as simple as possible
to focus on the key questions of interest. We solve the model to derive endogenous expressions for
wages, labor market conditions and the decision of whether or not to invest in education. Then we
consider comparative statics for these expressions to study the response to a policy change.
4.1 A search and matching model with human capital investments
In our model, individuals are either educated (high skill h) or uneducated (low skill l). We make
the simplifying assumption that there are separate markets for high and low skilled workers. The
different skill levels, denoted m ∈ {h, l}, correspond to productivity levels yh > yl.11 We further
assume that refugees may be in a temporary or a permanent state, s ∈ {T, P}. The type of
10For studies on investments in host country specific human capital, see for example Chiswick (1978), Cortes (2004)
and Duleep & Regets (1999).
11See Bennett et al. (2017) for a model where firms supply jobs for both immigrants and natives.
9
productivity we have in mind is host country specific and we assume that the value of being in
the host country is larger than the value of being in the home country, as this is consistent with
the asylum seeker fleeing the home country. We can therefore disregard the home country in the
model. As refugee seekers may lose temporary residency – something which became, ex ante, even
more likely with the 2002 law change – we include an exogenous probability of being deported
from the host country. Increasing this parameter value and examining the impact on employment
and education is then one of the scenarios we consider below. If the individual is deported he
or she gets nothing. Firms supply vms vacancies and unemployment rates are given by ums . The
transition rate for an unemployed refugee worker of skill level m into employment in state s is given
by fms (θms ) = (θms )α, where θms = vms /ums is the labor market tightness. Firm’s transition rates are
given by qms (θms ) = (θms )α−1. α ∈ (0, 1) is the match efficiency. We turn to the value functions
of workers and firms. Let UmT and EmT denote the expected present values of unemployment and
employment in the temporary state. The value functions are then given by:
rUmT = fmT (EmT − UmT ) + ρmu (UmP − UmT )− Γ(m)c(e)− (a+ du)UmT , (1)
rEmT = wmT + σ(UmT − EmT ) + ρme (EmP − EmT )− Γ(m)c(e)− (a+ de)EmT , (2)
where r is the exogenous discount rate, ρmu and ρme are the probabilities of moving from the tem-
porary to the permanent state as unemployed and employed respectively, Γ(m) is an indicator
function which takes the value one if the worker acquires education and zero otherwise, c(e) is the
cost of acquiring education, a is the exogenous transition rate out of the labor force, du and de are
the probabilities of being deported while unemployed or employed, and wmT is the sectoral wage.
We assume that individual workers i have different abilities, ei, and therefore different costs of ob-
taining education, c(ei). The variable ei is assumed to be uniformly distributed, ei ∈ [0, 1], and the
costs are decreasing in ability at a decreasing rate, c′(ei) < 0 and c′′(ei) > 0. Furthermore, in order
to guarantee a non-trivial solution where some, but not all, individuals choose to acquire education,
we assume that the individual with the highest ability faces a very low cost of education, c(1) = 0,
and the individual with the lowest ability faces very high costs of education, i.e. limei→0 c(ei) =∞.
Hence, Γ(h) = 1 and Γ(l) = 0.12
For the permanent state, the values of unemployment and employment are instead determined
by:
rUmP = fmP (EmP − UmP )− Γ(m)c(e)− aUmP , (3)
rEmP = wmP + σ(UmP − EmP )− Γ(m)c(e)− aEmP , (4)
12We assume that the educational cost is a cost to acquire and maintain education or skills. This is a simplifying
assumption and is not important for the results.
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where wmP is the sectoral wage in the permanent state. From the firm’s perspective, we let JmT
and V mT represent the expected present value of an occupied job and a vacant job in the transitory
state. The value functions for a job paying the wage wmT and a vacant job are then:
rJmT = ym − wmT + σ(V mT − JmT ) + ρme (JmP − JmT )− (a+ de)JmT , (5)
rV mT = qmT (JmT − V mT )− k − aV mT , (6)
where k are hiring costs. For firms in the permanent state we instead have:
rJmP = ym − wmP + σ(V mP − JmP )− aJmP , (7)
rV mP = qmP (JmP − V mP )− k − aV mP . (8)





Wages are determined by Nash Bargaining with equal bargaining power, giving the first order
condition Ems −Ums = Jms −V ms . For the permanent state we use equations (1)-(6) and assume free
entry. Furthermore, in the baseline case, we assume that the risk of being deported is the same
for individuals who are employed and unemployed, i.e. de = du = d. Then we can look at the
impact of a change in the deportation rate in Section 4.1.4. We make the simplifying assumption
that ρhe = ρhu. The rationale behind this is that despite the general increase in the number of years
before an immigrant could apply for permanent residency increased, some special conditions were
in place for workers. Hence, uneducated workers, as they empirically face a higher unemployment
rate, were worse off than educated workers and, in particular, if they happened to be unemployed.
We arrive at the following expression for wages in the permanent state:
wmP = 0.5(ym + kθmP ), (9)
From this expression we see that wages are increasing in labor market tightness and in the produc-
tivity. For the transitory state we get a slightly more complicated expression for wages:
wmT = 0.5
(
ym + r + a+ d+ ρ
m
e
r + a+ d+ ρmu
kθmT −
(ρme − ρmu )
r + a
r + a+ d




which is still increasing in productivity.13
13For educated workers, as we assume ρhe = ρhu, we can simplify to get:
whT = 0.5(yh + kθhT ). (11)
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4.1.2 Labor market tightness
Next we turn to labor market conditions. Labor market tightness, θms , is defined as vacancies
relative to the unemployment rate. Here we derive expressions for the transitory and permanent
state only in terms of exogenous parameters and the endogenous labor market tightness. For the
transitory state we use equations (5)–(6) and assume free entry to arrive at the following expression
for uneducated workers:
(r + a+ σ + ρle + d)2k(θlT )1−α =
(r + a+ σ + ρle)yl
r + a+ σ −
r + a+ d+ ρle






r + a+ d




r + a+ σ
)
θlP , (12)
and for educated workers:
(r + a+ σ + ρhe + d)2k(θhT )1−α =
(r + a+ σ + ρhe )yh




r + a+ σkθ
h
P . (13)
For the permanent state we instead get:
(r + a+ σ)2k(θmP )1−α = ym − kθmP . (14)
We can show that labor market tightness facing temporary workers is lower than labor market
tightness facing permanent workers, θmT < θmP .14 This is then consistent with a higher employment
rate for permanent workers than temporary permit workers. The reason is that the firm supplying
vacancies to temporary permit workers faces a lower duration of a potential match and therefore
supplies fewer vacancies for a given pool of unemployed job seekers. In Section C we show that
labor market tightness, θmT , increases in ρme and decreases in ρmu . Furthermore, wages, wmT , increase
in ρmu whereas the effect of a change in ρme on wages is indeterminate.15
4.1.3 Education
We now turn to the human capital investment decision: whether or not to invest in education.
For simplicity, we consider workers in the transitory state, which is the main state of interest in
the empirical part of the paper. When a worker makes this decision, she compares the value of
unemployment as an educated worker, bearing the associated costs of education, to the value of
unemployment as an uneducated worker. The marginal worker has ability level, eˆ, which makes
her indifferent between acquiring higher education and remaining as an uneducated worker. We
write the condition determining the ability level of the marginal worker as:
rUhT (eˆ) = rU lT . (15)
14Details available upon request.
15We also note that labor market tightness decreases when the deportation rate, d, increases. The same is true for
wages.
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Workers proceed to higher education if the expected income gains from education exceed their cost
of education. We rewrite equation (1) and subtract this expression from equation (3), and use the
free entry condition to arrive at the following rewritten expression for (15):{
(r + a)θhT + ρhuθhP −
r + a+ d+ ρhu
r + a+ d+ ρlu
(
(r + a)θlT + ρluθlP
)} k
r + a+ ρhu
= c(eˆ). (16)
Here we have a condition determining eˆ as a function of exogenous parameters and endogenous
variables, θmT and θmP for m ∈ {h, l}. Workers with ability level ei below the threshold level, ei ≤ eˆ,
choose not to invest in education, whereas workers with ei > eˆ choose to do so. Hence, eˆ and (1− eˆ)
constitute the uneducated and educated labor forces respectively. The right hand side of equation
(16) is equal to the expected income gain of investing in education. This gain needs to be positive in
order for at least some workers to proceed to higher education. The fact that productivity is higher
for educated workers means that there is an educational wage premium, which in turn provides
incentives for higher education as well as a higher probability of getting a job.
4.1.4 Impact of a policy change
Finally, we turn to the impact of a policy change on employment and education. For this purpose
we will consider three different cases, which are consistent with the law change and which give us
hypotheses to test in the data. As mentioned above, despite the general increase in the number of
years before an immigrant could apply for permanent residency increased, some special conditions
were in place for workers. Hence, uneducated workers were worse off than educated workers as
they have a lower probability of obtaining employment than educated workers. In the first case, we
therefore assume that the likelihood of obtaining a permanent permit is reduced only for uneducated
and unemployed individuals, dρlu < 0. In the second case we consider the impact of a decrease in the
likelihood of obtaining a permanent permit for employed uneducated workers, dρle < 0. Finally, in
order to capture a final related implication of the law change, namely that the probability of losing
a temporary permit increased, we consider an increase in the deportation risk, dde = ddu = dd > 0.
Case 1 If dρlu < 0, this means that the likelihood of obtaining permanent residency is decreased
only for unemployed uneducated individuals. In this case education increases. There are two coun-
teracting forces at play. First, the relative value of being educated (and unemployed) increases as
the value of being uneducated unemployed decreases. This increases the value of obtaining an edu-
cation. Second, there is an increase in labor market tightness for the uneducated workers because
their wages fall and this increases employment (they will be more eager to have a job when the
value of being unemployed falls). This effect tends to reduce the number of individuals that acquire
education. The former effect dominates and more individuals invest in education.
Case 2 If dρle < 0, the likelihood of obtaining a permanent residency for employed uneducated
workers diminishes. A lower probability of permanent residency reduces labor market tightness,
and thus employment, for this group of workers. This is because the match between a worker and a
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firm will last shorter. The negative impact on labor market tightness dominates (the effect on wages
is indeterminate) and incentives to acquire education increases. There is an increase in education
investments.
Case 3 Finally, if ρme = ρmu we can look at the impact of dd > 0, i.e. an increase in the deportation
rate. The value of unemployment falls when the probability of losing a temporary permit increases
equally for both educated and uneducated workers. Fewer vacancies are supplied and labour market
tightness falls for both educational groups which reduces employment. The impact will be stronger for
educated workers because of their higher productivity and thus fewer individuals acquire education.
It should be noted that our analysis, thus far, abstracts from the fact that the intensity of the
effects may differ across time.16 In our setting we are interested in changes to behavior that occur
over time. Specifically, we look at outcomes over time after approval and compare individuals with
different lengths of temporary protection. Dynamic effects will be discussed further in Section 6.
5 Empirical strategy
In this section we describe our data sources and the empirical strategy used for analysis.
5.1 Data
Our main data set is register data collected by Statistics Denmark. For the purpose of this study
we combine two sources of Danish micro data. First, from Statistics Denmark we have register
data on a broad set of outcomes for all immigrants in Denmark between the years 1997–2015. This
data set includes all immigrants who were registered as living in Denmark on January 1 in any
of the years 1997 to 2015, which means that we can follow our sample up until twelve years after
their initial application for asylum was approved. Second, using unique register data from the
Danish Immigration Service we observe, for each individual, the type of residence permit as well
as dates of application and approval. Using individual identifiers, this data can be linked to our
main data set and enables us to define relevant treatment and control groups, as discussed in more
detail in Section 5.2. Our main variables of interest include educational investments and labor
market outcomes. We study enrollment defined as the share of individuals that, at some point
during the twelve years of data that we observe, enroll in general education or in education at the
university level specifically.17 In terms of labor market outcomes, we focus on employment status
and labor earnings (including self-employment). Employment status is the share of individuals that
are registered as employed (or self-employed) at some point during the twelve years that we observe,
16As shown in for example the literature on effects of unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment duration,
where duration dependence can be expected to matter. See for example Nekoei & Weber (2017) where extended
UI benefits are found to lengthen unemployment, but also provide a better matching (measured in terms of wages).
Rosholm & Toomet (2005) is an example allowing for discouragement.
17Data comes from the educational registers UDDA and VEUV.
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whereas earnings are primarily measured after three and seven years of residency in Denmark (in
our analysis we also consider earnings at each specific year in time).18
From register data we also collect information on demographic characteristics (age, gender,
nationality, marital status and the number of children in the household) to be used as control
variables in the analysis.19 In addition, from the educational registers, we impute two different
measures of skill level at arrival. First, we use the highest level of education completed before
arrival in Denmark (primary/secondary or higher).20 Second, we use the entry level of Danish lan-
guage courses (1,2 or 3), because entry level is determined by the individual’s skill level.21 These
measures of initial skill level are used both as control variables and to split the sample in order to
study heterogeneous effects.22
Sample restrictions We remove individuals with no information on application date, and those
who applied for asylum before November 1, 2001 or after June 30, 2002. Without information on
application date we are not able to classify our relevant control and treatment groups. Figure 1
shows a time line of the period of interest and the way we split our sample into a control and a
treatment group. Our control group is defined as individuals applying for asylum between November
1, 2001 and February 27, 2002, while the treatment group includes individuals applying between
February 28 and June 30, 2002. The sample split is chosen to ensure that nothing else is happening
that would affect those applying prior to and post the cutoff differentially. As discussed in Section
3.1 there were several components to the 2002 reform, apart from the prolonged waiting time for
permanent residency. To avoid confounding effects from these other components, that mainly relied
on the date of approval, we also restrict our sample to individuals whose applications were approved
after July 1, 2002. The reason for this restriction is that we want to compare asylum holders who
only differ in terms of which rules regarding permanent residency they are subject to, and not in
any other dimensions. As described in Section 3.1 the reform included changes to, for example,
the benefit structure. Because of long processing times this restriction on the approval date does
not reduce our sample by much. Figure 2 shows the fraction of individuals in 2001 and 2002 whose
applications were approved post July 1, 2002, by month of application. We also exclude individuals
18Data comes from the INK and RAS registers.
19These variables come from the population register (BEF). To determine marital status at arrival, we assume
that if the date for the first change in marital status is missing, the change must have happened before arriving to
Denmark (or it would have been recorded). Children at arrival is defined by considering all children born before
the application year and associated with the first family identifier available in the registers after the first asylum
application.
20Primary/secondary education includes early childhood education and primary education as well as lower and
upper secondary education. Higher education includes university studies (short cycle tertiary, bachelor, master and
doctoral).
21Level 1 is for students with no or limited educational background, or those who are considered to have limited
learning abilities because of trauma, level 2 is for students with some (normal) educational background and level 3 is
for students with higher education (who often speak several languages).
22All information on education comes from the two registers UDDA and VEUV.
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lodging their application from abroad.23 The unit of analysis is throughout the individual. Finally,
because we are interested in educational and labor market outcomes, we focus on individuals who
are between the age of 16–60 at the time of application.
5.2 Identification
The implementation of the reform implies that refugees who applied for asylum prior to February
28, 2002 (henceforth referred to as the cutoff) were able to apply for permanent residency three years
after approval, whereas those who applied after the cutoff had to wait for seven years. The fact that
this reform was implemented retroactively gives rise to a regression discontinuity in time setting
with no possibility of manipulation around the cutoff. The reform was decided on June 6, 2002 and
took effect on July 1, 2002 - but the part of the reform that we are studying applied retroactively
to everyone who applied from February 28, 2002 and onward. This means that neither immigrants,
nor the decision makers at the DIS, could have perfectly manipulated the date of application in
order to achieve a certain treatment status. Intuitively, individuals who applied just before the
cutoff should therefore be comparable to individuals who applied just after the cutoff.
Looking at aggregate statistics from The Danish Immigration Service (2003) in Figure 3, we
conclude that there is no major change in the number of lodged asylum applications in Denmark
from February to March 2002. In our data, we observe only individuals whose asylum application
was subsequently approved. Figure 4 shows the number of approved applications by month of
application and type of asylum during 2002. Again, we see no notable change in the number
of approvals around the cutoff. As we observe the actual date of application, we also present a
histogram of the number of granted asylum applications using the week of application in Figure
5.24 The absence of a spike in the density of applications made just before the cutoff is in line with
our intuition as the reform was implemented retroactively, leaving no room for manipulation.25
In the regression discontinuity framework, treatment effects are identified by estimating the
magnitude of the discontinuity at the cutoff. While the sharp cutoff implied by the reform intuitively
lends itself to the regression discontinuity approach, ideally one would want to compare individuals
on each side close to the cutoff. As Denmark approves a relatively small number of asylum seekers,
we have to use a relatively broad bandwidth of four months on each side of the cutoff (119 days
between November 2001 to June 2002). This leads attention to the inherent trade off between
precision and bias in the regression discontinuity framework. Extending the bandwidth around the
cutoff increases precision, but also the risk of introducing bias. As our running variable is the date
of application, we have to estimate treatment effects parametrically in order to avoid confounding
time-varying effects. The regression equation is specified as:
23This means dropping three individuals that would otherwise have been included in the control group.
24We aggregate to the weekly level to comply with the micro data policy of Statistics Denmark.
25In Table 6 in Appendix H.4.1 we present the results from a formal test of manipulation at the cutoff using
the Stata package rddensity. We implement this test for a linear and a quadratic specification. For the linear
specification we get a p-value of 0.121 while the quadratic specification gives us a p-value of 0.935.
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Yi = α+ βTi + h(x˜i) + Tih(x˜i) + Zi + i, (17)
where Yi is the outcome of individual i, x˜i is the normalized date of application such that February
28, 2002, is set to zero and h(·) is a continuous function of the date of application, Ti is an indicator
for treatment status with Ti = 0 if x˜i < 0 and Ti = 1 otherwise, and εi is the error term. We
include an interaction between h(x˜i) and the treatment indicator Ti, to allow for different trends
over time on each side of the cutoff. β is the coefficient of interest measuring the effect of being
subject to the new rules on permanent residency. In our main specification, h(·) is specified as a
linear function. In Section 7 we vary the order of the polynomial to test the robustness of our
results. Furthermore, all specifications are estimated with and without a vector of predetermined
individual characteristics, Zi, to increase efficiency and confirm that covariates do not affect the
point estimates.26
For the graphical representation (in Section F), we plot the mean of each outcome for evenly
spaced bins of the running variable. For each plot, we fit a global linear polynomial to approximate
the population CEF, using a uniform kernel and evenly spaced bins.27 For all plots, we use the
full bandwidth of 119 days and we do not include covariates. We also present similar graphs of
predetermined characteristics, to substantiate the continuity assumption underlying the regression
discontinuity framework, see Figures 7–9 in Section E. In terms of predetermined characteristics we
look at demographic characteristics and educational background. For demographic characteristics
we look at the fraction of males, household characteristics and average age, as well as nationality.
For educational background we look at both a self-reported measure of the highest level of education
achieved, and the level of Danish studies that the individual is assigned to. The reason to consider
these characteristics is because they are predetermined variables that we believe may impact how
individuals are affected by the reform. We find significant discontinuities in terms of nationalities.
There is a positive jump for other nationalities (of 0.175), and a negative jump for Afghans (-
0.128).28 There is a marginally significant discontinuity in the share of males (0.136). We also
estimate labor earnings one year after approval by regressing labor earnings on predetermined
characteristics. We then estimate the regression discontinuity using the predicted values for earnings
and do not find any discontinuities in this variable.
Table 1 compare means of predetermined characteristics for the control and treatment group
26Although it has been standard practice in regression discontinuity designs to cluster on the running variable, we
choose to follow Kolesa´r & Rothe (2017) and abstain from clustering using only robust standard errors. We have
repeated all estimations for the full sample with clustering on the running variable and find that not clustering is the
more conservative approach for all outcomes. Results from estimations using clustering are available on request.
27These plots are produced using the Stata package rdplot, for more details see Sebastian Calonico & Titiunik
(2014). Graphs using a quadratic polynomial for our main outcomes are available upon request.
28Other nationalities is defined as a dummy equal to one if the individual is not from one of the most common
countries of origin: Afghanistan, Former Yugoslavia, Iraq or Somalia.
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as well as their normalized difference.29 The normalized difference gives us a a scale-invariant mea-
sure of the magnitude of the difference between the groups. We consider differences above 0.25
to be signs of sizable differences. We note that the groups are generally well balanced over the
whole 8 month period that defines our sample of interest. Again, the biggest differences arise in
terms of nationalities: there are more Iraqis in the control group, and more individuals from other
nationalities in the treatment group. In addition, there are fewer males in the treatment group.
Apart from these variables the two groups appear balanced. However, as a small sample size is
challenging in a regression discontinuity framework, we complement our analysis by looking at the
difference in average outcomes over time by treatment status.
Heterogeneous effects Finally, to capture potential heterogeneity in response to the reform
we split the sample by (i) level of education at arrival (below/above university level, henceforth
referred to as low/high skilled) and (ii) gender (males/females).30 The reform may have had
different impact on different groups of refugees depending on their access to the labor market as
this could determine how much they were able to affect their probability of being granted residency
based on labor market attachment. We believe that these sample splits can capture important
differences in terms of labor market access. Related to our theoretical model, we believe that these
groups may also differ in their cost of acquiring education in the host country. Other potentially
interesting sample splits would be to look at age groups and country of origin, but splitting the
sample along these dimensions is not feasible due to the small sample size and the distribution of
these variables. For the subgroup analysis we split the sample by subgroup and estimate equation
17.
6 Results
This section presents and discusses our empirical findings. We present both estimates from the
regression analysis and graphical evidence. The graphical evidence is based on the estimated
discontinuity at the cutoff date. For these figures we always use a bandwidth of 119 days on each
side of the cutoff and we do not include any covariates. For the regression analysis we present
results with and without covariates for the 119 days bandwidth.
29See Imbens & Woolridge (2009) for a motivation for using the normalized difference. The measure is defined as:
nd = x¯t − x¯c√
(sd2t + sd2c) /2
30We check the overlap between these groups and note the following. Around 47 percent of females are classified
as low skilled, and around 22 percent as high skilled. Among males the division is similar with 43 percent of men
classified as low skilled and 26 percent classified as high skilled. For around 30 percent of both males and females we
do not observe skill level at arrival. The correlation between gender and skill level is 0.07.
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6.1 Educational outcomes
Human capital investments can be viewed as part of the integration process. Table 2 shows our
estimated results for the full sample as well as for the subgroups based on gender and skill level. First
we look at enrollment in formal education. This variable measures the share of individuals that, at
some point during the twelve years we observe in our data, enroll in any type of formal education
(primary, secondary or university). Columns (1) and (2) show the estimated coefficients with and
without covariates for the full sample. We estimate a positive effect of around 17 percentage points
at the cutoff. The effect is significant at the 5 percent level without controls and at the 1 percent
level for the specifications with controls. Panel (a) in Figure 10 confirms this picture and we observe
a clear jump at the threshold. Turning to the subgroups analyzed in columns (3–10) we see that
the effect is driven by females and, to a lesser degree, low skilled individuals. For females the
estimated effect is an increase of 22 percentage points at the cutoff, significant at the 5 percent
level for the specification with covariates (the effect is slightly stronger without covariates). Next,
we estimate the effect on enrollment at the university level. This variable measures the share of
individuals that enroll in university education at some point in time during the twelve years that
we observe. The estimated coefficient is positive at around 6 percentage points but not significant
(for low skilled the estimated coefficient is around 11 percentage points and significant at the 10
percent level).31 Figure 12 shows the evolution of enrollment rates over time (panel (a)). Here we
look at the share of individuals that are enrolled in education in a specific year (through a fitted
quadratic polynomial with 95 percent confidence intervals). This shows that the treatment group
has overall higher enrollment rates over time for general education. Finally, in Appendix H.3.1
(panel (a) in Figure 21) we look at the estimated effect at the cutoff for enrollment in education at
each year after arrival separately. We note that the effect, if anything, appears to be stronger over
time.
We interpret the positive effect on enrollment in education as an increased investment in
human capital and integration. However, in order for integration to be successful it is relevant to
consider what this enrollment results in. Therefore, we also consider different types of education
that might be particularly relevant for access to the labor market (adult education and labor
market training), the propensity to complete an education and the number of years in education
(throughout we exclude Danish courses which are mandatory for both groups). These results are
available upon request. We do not find significant effects on any of these variables. For females, who
show the largest increase in the propensity to be enrolled in education, we find support for a higher
propensity to be classified as a student in the long run (measured seven years after approval). This
implies that they are more likely to be students compared to working or being unemployed, and
could indicate that females substitute work for education in order to increase their human capital.
Alternatively, females could be having a harder time getting access to the labor market and enroll
31We also test for difference in means between the control and treatment group. There is a marginally significant
difference between the two groups for enrollment in general education, with higher enrollment rates for the treatment
group.
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in education by necessity rather than choice.
Our findings for enrollment are in line with the hypotheses in Case 1 and Case 2 from our
theoretical model, i.e. that the change in the ex ante probability of obtaining a permanent residence
permit was especially pronounced for low skill individuals or those further away from the labor
market. We believe that females are, if anything, likely to be less attached to the labor market
compared to males. Thus, our findings, with strong effects among females and low skilled, are in
line with the theoretical model. If the only change was an increased deportation rate, as in Case
3, we would instead have expected a decrease in enrollment. We now turn to look directly at labor
market outcomes.
6.2 Labor market outcomes
Labor market outcomes are a direct measure of attachment to the labor market which makes them
directly relevant to study. Furthermore, in the previous section we did not find any significant
effects on human capital investments for males. This could be because they instead find jobs to
a greater extent, which makes it important to look at labor market outcomes also for subgroups.
We consider whether an individual was ever employed (including self-employment) in Denmark
and look at labor earnings after three and seven years of residency. Employment is defined as the
share of individuals (in the treatment and control group) that are ever employed or self-employed
during the twelve years following their initial approval of asylum. Table 3 shows the estimated
regression results for the full sample and our four subgroups. In addition, panels (c)–(e) in Figure
10 show the graphical presentation of our results. For the full sample we do not find any significant
effects on employment or earnings. When we look at earnings conditional on employment we have
a marginally significant negative effect when including controls (these results are available upon
request). All coefficients are negative but imprecisely estimated. The graphical evidence also show
a small negative jump, but there are no indications of a sizable and significant negative effect.
Turning to the subgroups the picture is very similar to the results for the full sample. However,
females (and to some extent high skilled) show significant negative effects on earnings. This is
consistent with more females being enrolled in education. For males, who were not more likely to
be enrolled in education, there is no significant effect on any of the labor related outcomes. Figure
13 confirms this picture looking graphically at employment and earnings for each year, and in
Appendix H.3.1 (Figure 21) we estimate the coefficients for each of the different years after arrival.
The conclusions remain the same. If anything, there are signs of a more negative impact on earnings
in later years. To try to understand potential mechanisms, Figure 23 in Appendix H.3.2 looks at
the fitted quadratic polynomial over time for earnings conditional on employment in the different
subgroups (because the subgroups are small already before conditioning on employment we do not
estimate regressions for this outcome). We note a difference in that earnings for women who are
employed appear to be very similar in both groups, whereas there is a divergence for the high skilled
individuals with the control group experiencing stronger earnings over time. It is noteworthy that
the divergence between the control and the treatment group appears 3–5 years after approval for
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this subgroup. This is around the time when individuals in the control group are eligible to apply
for permanent residency status, and is in line with high skilled individuals in the treatment group
accepting jobs with lower earnings compared to the control group. This could be a sign of weaker
bargaining power of the individuals in the treatment group, or that employers are more reluctant
to invest in individuals whose future in the country (and thus also in the firm) is more uncertain.
This is consistent with Case 3 in our model, where employment falls for both educational groups.
We also look at the highest skill level ever achieved on the labor market during the years we
observe (more details on skill level in Appendix H.5) and the number of times an individual changes
workplace. We find no difference in the number of times individuals change workplace during the
twelve years we observe them in Denmark, but they generally appear to do so at a decreasing rate
over time (which may be in line with a more stable labor market attachment). For high skilled we
estimate a weakly significant negative effect on the highest skill level achieved on a job. This could
imply that high skilled accept jobs that they are potentially over-qualified for. We conclude that
the increased enrollment in education does not seem to have translated into improved labor market
outcomes at any time horizon.32
In terms of labor market outcomes, in can be related to our theoretical model in the following
way. Case 1 and 2 had the same implications for investments in education, but differed in the
impact on labor market tightness and therefore employment. The empirical evidence is consistent
with the relative reduction in the probability of obtaining permanent residency for employed versus
unemployed workers being such that the counteracting impacts cancel out. Females, however,
do show negative effects on earnings which is more in line with Case 1, i.e. that unemployed
and uneducated individuals were most negatively affected, as we think of females to be further
away from the labor market. It should, however, be noted that we do not see a divergence in
earnings conditional on employment when we look at earnings dynamics graphically. This is, in
turn, consistent with Case 3 in our theoretical model and in line with the reform having a negative
impact on refugees in general, because of the perceived risk of losing a match, and on individuals
further away from the labor market in particular.
7 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we perform sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our results. In particular,
we consider standard tests for the validity of our regression discontinuity approach. Furthermore,
we investigate the importance of calender effects.
7.1 Placebo tests
A standard test in this type of design is to test for placebo effects by estimating the same model, but
varying the location of the cutoff. Discontinuities at other cutoff points (where nothing happened)
may suggest that discontinuities at the real cutoff are not due to the reform. We split the main
32Results are available upon request.
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sample into the control and treatment group separately. Then, following Imbens & Lemieux (2008),
we test for discontinuities in our outcome variables at the median date of application in each of the
two groups. The advantage of splitting the sample into the control and treatment group is that we
avoid fitting a regression function over a point where we expect a discontinuity to occur. We could
test for discontinuities at other points within each of these sub-samples, but using the median gives
us more power to detect potential discontinuities. Tables 7–9 in Appendix H.4.2 present the results
from this placebo analysis. For most variables, we do not find any significant discontinuities at the
placebo cutoff. For employment we estimate a significant (at the 10 percent level) discontinuity
with inclusion of covariates. In addition, for a few other variables, when we include the other
outcomes discussed in more detail in Section 8, we detect a significant jump at the placebo cutoff.
This is the case for the share registered in Denmark, number of births and hospital visits for the
treatment group. Given the narrow bandwidth we have to implement for this test and the lower
number of observations we end up with, it is not surprising that we detect a few discontinuities as
we are not able to estimate the time trend and control function as well.
7.2 Choice of bandwidth
Given that the placebo test detected a few discontinuities at other values of the running variable
than the true cutoff point, we want to assess the robustness of our results in greater detail. More
specifically, we do a thorough investigation into the sensitivity of our results to changes in the
bandwidth. Our main results, presented in Tables 2-3, are estimated using a bandwidth of 119 days
around the cutoff point. We cannot extend the bandwidth further without including individuals
in the treatment group that were also subject to for example the change in benefit levels. For this
reason, our sensitivity analysis is restricted to analyzing the effects when decreasing the bandwidth.
For both predetermined characteristics and outcome variables, we present coefficients and
confidence intervals from estimating the regression discontinuity equation using bandwidths starting
at 21 days and then increasing the bandwidth by two days at the time until reaching 119 days
(our preferred bandwidth). Figures 15–17 in Appendix H.1 present the results from this analysis
for predetermined characteristics. Although confidence intervals suggest that even for smaller
bandwidths, the coefficients are in general not significantly different from zero, the coefficients
become much more stable at broader bandwidths. This analysis motivates the choice to use a
bandwidth of 119 days. Figures 18–20 in Appendix H.2 present the same type of analysis for our
outcome variables, and confirms our interpretation of the results. At broader bandwidths, the
coefficients are not sensitive to bandwidth changes.
Many papers that use the regression discontinuity approach choose to use optimal bandwidth
selection, a data driven approach to select how many observations on each side of the cutoff should
be used in the estimation. We have chosen to instead use the broadest bandwidth possible to isolate
the effect of this reform, i.e. use as many observations as possible without including individuals that
were also subject to other components of the 2002 reform. This gives us the bandwidth of 119 days.
We also estimate regressions for our main outcomes using the optimal bandwidth. Using optimal
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bandwidth selection, about 100 observations are used in estimations compared to the sample size of
635 when using the 119 days bandwidth. In general, coefficients estimated with optimal bandwidth
are in line with or larger in magnitude compared to our preferred specification. The exception is
enrollment, where the magnitude is smaller and non-significant without controls (although with
controls the magnitude is larger and the estimate is significant at the 10 percent level) when using
optimal bandwidth. In light of the low number of observations used in these estimations, the 119
days bandwidth remains our preferred specification.33
7.3 Assumptions on the regression specification
Section 6 presented results from regression analysis using a linear function. We also replicate all our
main results using a quadratic polynomial. The main reason to include higher order polynomials
is to capture non-linearities in the underlying data. In our case, however, using a higher order
polynomial often appears to lead to overfitting and, thus, overestimation of the effect. Using the
linear specification is therefore the more conservative choice for most outcomes. The results for
enrollment are, however, sensitive to the inclusion of a second order polynomial. The estimated
effect is smaller in magnitude and imprecisely estimated. Looking at the graphical evidence in
Figure 10 (a), the linear fit seems more appropriate. The linear case remains therefore our preferred
specification.
The main specification uses a uniform kernel, but we have estimated all the results for the
full sample using a triangular kernel as well. The motivation for using a triangular kernel is that
it gives more weight to observations close to the cutoff, but given the low number of observations
in our sample, the uniform kernel remains our preferred specification. In general, the coefficients
using a triangular kernel are in line with or even larger in magnitude compared to our preferred
specification For enrollment the effect is slightly weaker at 13–15 percentage points. In addition, a
few other outcomes are now significant.34
7.4 Calendar effects
Our treatment group arrives, by definition, later to Denmark compared to our control group. One
worry related to this is that any observed effect depends on this difference rather than the reform
itself. For example, calender effects could potentially confound our results if the state of the labor
market differs between the points in time when the control and the treatment group get their
asylum approvals.35 In 2002, asylum seekers were not allowed to work until their applications were
approved, which means that we need to consider the difference in approval rates between treatment
and control. We note that the distribution of approval dates for the treatment and control groups
33Results using optimal bandwidth selection are available upon request.
34Results using a quadratic polynomial and using a triangular kernel are available upon request.
35Another concern could be if we think that asylum seekers arriving between November and February are inherently
different compared to asylum seekers arriving in the spring. We can control for potential differences in observed
characteristics but are not able to control for differences in unobserved characteristics.
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are quite similar, suggesting that there are no substantial differences in the time when our control
and treatment group are allowed to enter the labor market.36
Because approval dates of the two groups look rather similar (see Figure 6), it is possible that
processing times instead differ. We note that the control group had somewhat longer processing
time, implying that they spent more time in the asylum center awaiting their decision. If we
believe that the time in processing matters, for example because of discouragement from a lack
of meaningful activities or because a longer time spent in Denmark gave the control group an
advantage before entering the labor market, this could be of relevance. The differences are, however,
not so large that we believe they are likely to impact the results.37 Furthermore, Figure 7 shows
that there is no discontinuity in the processing time at the cutoff.
The appointment of a new government, on November 27, 2001, was, however, clearly associated
with stricter immigration policies to come. Discussions of these policies started formally in January–
February 2002 and there was media coverage on the intentions to implement measures aimed at
reducing immigration. This means that immigrants could have been aware of the intention to
reform Danish asylum policies. Still they would not have been able to foresee the exact timing of
the reform.
8 Other outcomes
We have focused on outcomes related to the labor market and human capital investments. These
variables are most directly related to the reform we are studying. However, there are several
other ways in which the lower ex ante probability of permanent residency (through a longer time
period with temporary residency) may have affected individual behavior. In addition to educational
investments and labor market outcomes, we therefore also explore if the reform affected crime
rates, health, family composition and the duration in Denmark. These outcomes are of interest to
understand the full impact of the reform.
Access to criminal registers allows us to observe whether individuals have been convicted for
any crime, as well as property crimes separately, during their time in Denmark. Our measure of
criminal activity captures the share of individuals that have ever been convicted during the twelve
years that we observe.38 This variable is included to consider potential outside options to the
regular labor market, as well as potential deterring effects of the prolonged temporary status. We
also assess the impact of the reform on health outcomes. In particular, we consider the number
of hospital/doctor visits over the twelve year period that we observe.39 This adds a dimension to
the analysis as an individual’s health status may affect both her current and future labor market
prospects. Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence that the reform imposed stress on refugees.
This makes health itself a relevant outcome if we want to consider the direct impact on refugees’
36Results are available upon request.
37Results are available upon request.
38From the KRAF register we access information on charges and convictions.
39This variable is created using data from the LPRPOP register on health care utilization and diagnoses.
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welfare, and more generally potential costs to society. Finally, we consider the effects on fertility
behavior by studying the number of births during the first twelve years in Denmark.40 The intuition
is that increased uncertainty about the future in Denmark could have discouraged individuals from
having children.
8.1 Duration in Denmark
First, however, we study if the reform had an impact on whether asylum holders actually stayed
in Denmark during the twelve years that we can observe them in the data. Individuals in the
treatment group faced the risk of losing their residence status for a longer time before they were
eligible to apply for permanent residency. This could lead to more individuals leaving Denmark,
because their asylum claim was no longer valid and they did not qualify for residency based on
labor market attachment. Further, asylum holders may have left Denmark by choice, due to the
change in regulations. This highlights the importance of looking at how long these individuals stay
in Denmark, since any effects on other outcome variables could potentially be driven by selection
effects of individuals having to, or choosing to, leave Denmark. Estimation results in Table 4 show
that there is no significant difference between the control and treatment group in the share that
is still registered in Denmark in 2015. This is true for the full sample as well as the different
subgroups, confirmed graphically in panel (e) of Figure 11, and it facilitates the interpretation of
our other results. It is unlikely that any effects are driven by selection in either the control or
treatment group.41
8.2 Crime
A change in the permit structure could have affected crime rates as the opportunity cost of criminal
activity may have changed. The reform we study could also have had a more direct effect on crime
rates, since a criminal record reflected negatively on applications for prolonged residency, implying
that a longer time period with temporary residency in combination with these stricter rules may
have deterred individuals from committing crimes. In addition, the reform may have impacted the
immigrant’s view of the host country and affected her willingness to comply with its norms and
laws.
We study the impact on convictions in general as well as on property crime specifically. This
variable measures the share of individuals that are ever convicted of any crime (for the general
case), or a property crime. Table 4 presents regression estimates for the full sample and our
subgroups. For the full sample we note a negative but non-significant coefficient of between 6
and 12 percentage points. If we instead look at property crime rates we note a significant (at the
40We use an indicator equal to one if the number of children in a family increases from one year to the other as a
measure of a birth.
41In Figure 22 in Appendix H.3.1, we present regression discontinuity estimates of the share still in Denmark for
each individual year up until twelve years after application. These results confirm that there is no significant difference
in the share staying in Denmark. In Table 5 in Appendix H we also confirm that the groups are still relatively well
balanced in 2015.
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5 percent level including controls) decrease of around 12 percentage points. This effect is mainly
driven by a reduction of around 25 percentage points for males (significant at the 1 percent level).42
The negative jump is confirmed in panel (a) and (b) in Figure 11 as well as in panels (a) and
(b) in Figure 14, showing the crime rates in the control and treatment group for the different years
over time. Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 22 in Appendix H.3.1 show that there is no clear trend in
the estimated coefficients over time.
8.3 Fertility behavior and Health
Finally, we study the impact on fertility behavior and health. The lower ex ante probability
of getting permanent residency in Denmark may have induced asylum holders to delay having
children. A reason for this could have been to achieve a more stable situation before starting a
family.43 Our variable of interest is the total number of times that individuals have children during
the years we observe.
In Table 4, the coefficients on the number of children born in the full sample are negative, but
the effect is non-significant. For females we estimate a significant (at the 5 percent level) decrease
in the number of new births, with a coefficient of around -0.7. Panel (c) in Figure 11 confirms
this picture for the discontinuity estimation, and panel (c) in Figure 14 shows no clear graphical
differences over time. Figure 22 in Appendix H.3.1 shows that there is not a very clear pattern if
we look at the estimated effect at different years after arrival. If anything, there is a small upward
trend in the coefficient in the later years.
Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that the reform created a more stressful situation for
asylum holders due to increased uncertainty about their future in Denmark. We explore this by
studying the effect on the total number of visits to health care centers and hospitals (during the
twelve years we observe). The results suggest no significant impact of the reform. This is true also
looking at the long run and at the estimated impact at different time horizons.
9 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of lowering the ex ante probability of receiving permanent residency
on refugees’ outcomes. We exploit a Danish reform in 2002 that prolonged the time period during
which a refugee was required to have been a legal resident before eligible to apply for a permanent
42There is also a statistically significant difference in means between the two groups, with lower rates for the
treatment group.
43This is in line with the model outlined by Ranjan (1999). He suggests that the irreversible aspect associated with
childbearing, together with the ability to postpone, lead people to postpone childbearing when there is uncertainty
about future income. The analogue to our context is straightforward, uncertainty about the future in Denmark may
have lead asylum holders to postpone childbearing. Gustafsson (2005) emphasizes that changes in fertility behavior
do not need to be driven by a change in expected family sizes, but due to changed timing of family formation.
Postponing having children pays off, because women who have children later earn more, all else equal. This could
play a role in our context, where the prolonged temporary period of the treatment group may have increased the
value of labor market attachment as an alternative way of receiving residency.
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resident permit. In light of recent asylum policy changes in Europe and elsewhere, this is an
important question with very little evidence to guide policymakers on how such reforms affect
the integration of refugees and their labor market prospects. While proponents of temporary
protection regimes often argue that stronger incentives to qualify for residency based on labor
market attachment will speed up the process of entering the labor market, we find no evidence of
positive effects on labor market outcomes. There is no difference in the employment rate between
individuals in the control and treatment group. Similarly there is no evidence of increased earnings,
the estimated coefficient is negative (but not significantly different from zero). On the other hand,
opponents argue that lowering the prospects of staying in the new host country may deter country
specific human capital investments since the expected payoff of doing so is discounted at a higher
rate. In contrast to this, we find large and significant effects on the enrollment rate, that are
driven by females and low skilled. The findings on investments in education are in line with the
cases from our theoretical model when the ex ante probability of getting permanent residency is
more negatively affected for low skilled individuals, which in the empirical analysis corresponds to
individuals further from the labor market.
We want to emphasize some limitations of our study. While the reform studied in this pa-
per in many ways is ideal for studying the effect of prolonged temporary status, the setting also
implies some challenges. Our sample size is limited for two reasons: (1) we only study outcomes
of individuals that are actually approved asylum, and (2) we need to restrict the time interval to
four months before and after the reform to avoid confounding policy changes. This means that we
need to be careful about the interpretability of our results. Furthermore, the external validity of
our results depends on the institutional setting. First, the composition of refugees is clearly time
dependent and depends on many things outside the control of the policy maker. Second, tempo-
rary protection regimes may be designed in many different ways, making it more or less easy to
compare other settings to the one we are studying in this paper. It is therefore relevant to compare
our results to future studies of temporary regimes studied in other settings. Finally, this paper
describes a variety of outcomes in terms of human capital investments and other variables that
may be affected by the reform. We have abstracted from many other outcomes in this first study of
the long run impact of lower ex ante probability of permanent residency. For example, the role of
intra-household relationships may be important in order to understand heterogeneity in responses
between females and males. Exploring this and other areas of interest, as well as more detailed
mechanisms, remain interesting tasks for the future.
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A The Danish asylum process
The process of applying for asylum in Denmark is governed by the Aliens Act from 1983, to which
several changes have been made over the years. This section will briefly describe the Danish
asylum system in effect around 2002 and builds upon information in The Danish Immigration
Service (2003). An asylum seeker arriving to Denmark under these conditions should report to the
police once at the boarder. The application is filed either at a local police station or at the center in
Sandholm. First, the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) will confirm that Denmark is responsible
for processing the asylum application. Asylum seekers that are not rejected at the boarder will be
sent to a registration center and, once identity and travel routes to Denmark have been established,
to one of several accommodation centers in the country. During the time when the application for
asylum is processed, accommodation and financial support of the asylum seeker is provided by the
DIS.44 Most asylum seekers will be accommodated at a residence center until the final decision
is made, but after six months from the application date the asylum seeker is allowed to find own
housing until the claim has been processed (but they are not allowed to buy property). During the
time when the application is processed, the asylum seeker is not allowed to accept any paid work.
Voluntary activities are provided, and there are also some compulsory activities.
The asylum application is handled by the DIS, which is the first instance of decision and they
will determine if the asylum application falls under the provisions of the Geneva Convention or the
Danish Aliens Act. The assessment is made using information provided by the asylum seeker as well
as information collected by the DIS on the asylum seekers country of origin. Convention refugee
status is regulated by the UN 1951 refugee convention. Asylum seekers who do not directly qualify
as refugees according to the definition of the Refugee Convention but who risk the death penalty or
being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in case of return to
his or her country of origin get protection status. This category extends the refugee status beyond
the UN refugee convention, to individuals with ”asylum reasons similar to those in the convention”.
Prior to the reform in 2002 this would fall under the de facto refugee status in the Danish Aliens
Act. As part of the reform, a new Status B was introduced with much stricter criteria to get
protection status. There are two different procedures, the normal procedure and the manifestly
unfounded procedure.45 If an application is rejected by the DIS under the normal procedure, it is
automatically appealed to the Refugee Appeals Board46 (whose decision is final), in order to speed
up the process. If the application is rejected, the individual can still obtain a residence permit for
humanitarian reasons or for other exceptional reasons (in which case decisions are made by the
Ministry of Integration, later the Ministry for Foreigners, Integration and Housing), although very
44In cooperation with the Danish Red Cross, the Danish Emergency Management unit and the municipalities of
Hansthom and Brovst.
45The manifestly unfounded procedure is applied when it is clear that the application cannot be approved. In this
case, there is no possibility to appeal, and the applicant has to leave Denmark immediately. It is, however, required
that the Danish Refugee Council (a NGO) agrees with the DIS’s assessment. If the Danish Refugee Council uses
their veto, the case will instead be processed under the normal procedure.
46An independent body with representatives from the government and the Danish Bar and Law Society.
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few individuals are considered for these types of residence permits. These decisions are final, and
cannot be appealed. If granted asylum based on humanitarian reasons, one can only stay in the
country for as long as those reasons are still present. What constitutes humanitarian reason has
varied over time and used to include for example families with small children from countries in war
and individuals suffering the effects of torture. Nowadays it is only granted to individuals with life-
threatening illness who cannot get treatment in their own country. Once recognized as a refugee,
social benefits are given on the same condition as for Danish citizens. The DIS required, according
to the 1999 integration plan, that the refugee resided in a specific municipality during a three year
integration program. Refugees would be assigned a municipality based on a quota system designed
to achieve even distribution, with considerations to circumstances related to the municipality and
the refugee. The integration program consisted of Danish culture courses, language classes, and
vocational training. After three years (prior to the reform), permanent residence permits were
conditioned on the performance in the integration program.
B Other reform components
We briefly describe the other components of the reform package below:
1. Access to the Danish welfare state was limited. Following the reform, individuals were required
to have been a resident in Denmark for seven out of the eight most recent years to get the
standard level of benefits. For others, benefits were lowered by 35 percent. This part of the
reform also applied to native Danes who had lived abroad. The change applied to all asylum
seekers who got their applications granted after July 1, 2002.
2. Family reunification of refugees was discouraged in several ways. First, by disallowing reuni-
fication for spouses under the age of 24 (both spouses had to be 24 years of age or older). In
addition, if a Danish citizen wanted to sponsor a spouse, the couple had to prove that their
“ties” were stronger to Denmark than to the country of the non-Danish spouse. Further, a
Danish citizen could no longer sponsor a parent aged 60 years or older. This change applied
to applications for family reunion lodged after July 1, 2002.
3. The de facto refugee status was abolished. This status previously implied that an individual
could get asylum even if the criteria of the UN Geneva Convention from 1951 were not
satisfied. This was no longer possible. Instead, a new status B was introduced with a more
narrow scope. This change applied to all refugees who lodged their applications after July 1,
2002.
4. Prior to the reform, it was possible to apply for asylum in Denmark at a Danish embassy or
consulate abroad. This possibility was abolished by the reform.47 The possibility to lodge an
47During the first six months of 2002, 354 individuals lodged their asylum applications from abroad. In 2001 that
number was 1,933 with a vast majority of the applications (1,669) coming from the embassy in Afghanistan (The
Danish Immigration Service, 2003).
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application abroad was removed as of July 1, 2002.
We define our control and treatment groups to make sure these other changes do not interfere with




To study the impact on θlT of changing ρle and ρlu we evaluate the expression in equation (12)
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The impact on labor market tightness from a change in ρle is positive, whereas the impact from
a change in ρlu is negative. Next we look at the impact of changes to ρle and ρlu on wages in the
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This means that the impact on wages from a change in ρle is indeterminate, whereas the effect of
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We see that labor market tightness decreases as the deportation risk increases, implying that labor
market conditions deteriorate.
C.2 Impact of policy
Case 1: In the first case we consider a reduction in the likelihood of obtaining permanent
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c′(eˆ) > 0.
Noting that c′(e) < 0 we find that there is a positive relationship between eˆ and ρlu. Because the
policy change implied a decrease in ρlu we conclude that the impact of the policy is a decrease in
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eˆ and thus an increase in the share of individuals that acquire education (remember that eˆ is the
share of uneducated individuals).
Case 2: In the second case we consider a reduction in the likelihood of obtaining permanent
residency only for employed low skill workers, dρle < 0 (around ρhu = ρlu). We then find that:
deˆ
dρle
= − (r + a)k





There is a positive relationship between the share of uneducated individuals and the probability of
permanent residency. This means that a decrease in ρle will increase investments in education.
Case 3: Finally, in the third case, we consider an increase in the deportation risk, de = du = d
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1
c′(eˆ) > 0.
This implies that when the deportation risk increases, fewer individuals invest in education.
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D Descriptive analysis
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Data source: The Danish Immigration Service (2003).
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Figure 5: Density of running variable
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E Balance
Table 1: Comparison of means (bw 119 days)
(1) (2) (2)–(1)
Control Treatment Normalized difference
Demographic characteristics
Male 0.54 0.43 -0.22
(0.50) (0.50)
No. of children 1.71 1.57 -0.07
(1.90) (2.03)
Partner 0.51 0.56 0.10
(0.50) (0.50)
Age at application 31.00 31.47 0.05
(9.10) (9.72)
Education
Danish 1 0.21 0.24 0.07
(0.41) (0.43)
Danish 2 0.40 0.36 -0.08
(0.49) (0.48)
Danish 3 0.27 0.27 0.00
(0.45) (0.45)
Primary or secondary 0.45 0.47 0.04
(0.50) (0.50)
Higher 0.24 0.22 -0.05
(0.43) (0.42)
Country of origin
Afghanistan 0.34 0.30 -0.09
(0.48) (0.46)
Iraq 0.19 0.10 -0.26
(0.39) (0.30)
Former Yugoslavia 0.10 0.15 0.15
(0.31) (0.36)
Somalia 0.17 0.13 -0.11
(0.37) (0.33)
Other 0.19 0.32 0.30
(0.40) (0.47)
N 372 263
Notes: Values in parenthesis are (s.d.). Demographic characteristics are measured at application. Danish 1 -
Danish 3 indicates the level of Danish courses assigned at approval, whereas primary or secondary and higher
education indicates the level of education acquired prior to applying for asylum in Denmark. The normalized
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Notes: The graphs are generated using evenly spaced bins, a linear polynomial and a uniform kernel.
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F Regression discontinuity graphs and regressions
Figure 10: Education and labor market outcomes
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Notes: The graphs are generated using evenly spaced bins, a linear polynomial and a uniform kernel. Enrollment is
a dummy variable equal to one if the individual at some point is enrolled in general education. Enrollment university
is the corresponding variable for university education. Employed is a dummy equal to one if the individual was ever
employed in Denmark. Earnings is total labor earnings from employment and/or self-employment after three and
seven years.
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Notes: The graphs are generated using evenly spaced bins, a linear polynomial and a uniform kernel. Registered in
Denmark 2015 is a dummy equal to one if the individual is registered in Denmark year 2015. Criminal conviction is
a dummy equal to one if ever convicted of any crime. Property crime is equal to one if ever convicted of a property
crime. Giving birth is the number of times a family has more children. Hospital visits is the number of doctor/hospital
visits.
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Table 2: Education outcomes
Outcome Full sample Male Female High skill Low skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Enrollment 0.176∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.094 0.114 0.278∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.002 -0.046 0.180∗ 0.157∗
(0.070) (0.066) (0.096) (0.092) (0.103) (0.093) (0.138) (0.133) (0.104) (0.095)
N 635 635 315 315 320 320 150 150 292 292
Enrollment university 0.066 0.059 0.066 0.070 0.071 0.038 -0.099 -0.138 0.119∗ 0.107∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.063) (0.063) (0.060) (0.056) (0.107) (0.107) (0.063) (0.059)
N 635 635 315 315 320 320 150 150 292 292
Covariates NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: Regressions are estimated for the different groups using a polynomial of order 1 and a uniform kernel. High skilled is defined as having a university
education, while low skilled have primary or secondary education upon arrival in Denmark. Covariates include age at application, gender, partner, number of
children, education level and dummies for the most common nationalities (Afghanistan, Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Somalia). Enrollment is a dummy variable
equal to one if the individual at some point is enrolled in general education. Enrollment university is the corresponding variable for university education. *,
** and *** denotes significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 3: Labor market outcomes
Outcome Full sample Male Female High skill Low skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Employed -0.041 -0.096 -0.002 0.008 -0.088 -0.137 -0.037 -0.134 -0.053 -0.135
(0.080) (0.073) (0.100) (0.095) (0.121) (0.111) (0.170) (0.147) (0.111) (0.101)
N 635 635 315 315 320 320 150 150 292 292
Earnings 3Y -7,051 -22,536 -9,772 -12,544 -21,887 -27,372∗∗ 7,385 -4,854 11,043 -10,544
(19,971) (18,054) (34,664) (33,728) (14,046) (13,682) (39,737) (34,465) (26,473) (22,529)
N 601 601 294 294 307 307 143 143 285 285
Earnings 7Y -22,722 -41,671 -13,564 -16,631 -46,607∗ -53,064∗∗ -90,460 -125,518∗∗ 2,481 -17,994
(27,907) (25,969) (50,659) (49,954) (23,948) (23,539) (58,893) (53,692) (30,982) (29,911)
N 563 563 266 266 297 297 133 133 278 278
Covariates NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: Regressions are estimated for the different groups using a polynomial of order 1 and a uniform kernel. High skilled is defined as having a university
education, while low skilled have primary or secondary education upon arrival in Denmark. Covariates include age at application, gender, partner, number of
children, education level and dummies for the most common nationalities (Afghanistan, Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Somalia). Employed is a dummy equal
to one if the individual was ever employed in Denmark. Earnings is total labor earnings from employment and/or self-employment after three and seven years.
*, ** and *** denotes significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 4: Crime, Fertility behavior and Health
Outcome Full sample Male Female High skill Low skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
In Denmark 2015 -0.009 0.003 0.047 0.061 -0.052 -0.041 -0.020 -0.005 -0.044 -0.024
(0.049) (0.048) (0.077) (0.075) (0.055) (0.055) (0.100) (0.100) (0.069) (0.065)
N 635 635 315 315 320 320 150 150 292 292
Crime
Criminal conviction -0.065 -0.119 -0.313∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗ 0.103 0.054 0.001 -0.065 -0.044 -0.049
(0.076) (0.072) (0.110) (0.107) (0.010) (0.099) (0.166) (0.143) (0.111) (0.103)
N 635 635 315 315 320 320 150 150 292 292
Property crime -0.105∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ 0.057 0.031 -0.197 -0.222∗ -0.075 -0.071
(0.056) (0.056) (0.073) (0.072) (0.087) (0.087) (0.127) (0.119) (0.087) (0.085)
N 635 635 315 315 320 320 150 150 292 292
Fertility behavior
Giving birth -0.311 -0.188 0.393 0.313 -0.729∗∗ -0.661∗∗ -0.498 0.030 -0.362 -0.292
(0.257) (0.236) (0.368) (0.341) (0.364) (0.305) (0.590) (0.563) (0.395) (0.343)
N 635 635 315 315 320 320 150 150 292 292
Health status
Hospital visits -1.312 -0.000 0.755 -0.040 -1.130 0.281 1.091 3.627 -1.077 0.118
(2.098) (1.983) (2.235) (2.217) (3.412) (3.431) (6.819) (6.328) (2.681) (2.324)
N 635 635 315 315 320 320 150 150 292 292
Covariates NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: Regressions are estimated for the different groups using a polynomial of order 1 and a uniform kernel. High skilled is defined as having a university
education, while low skilled have primary or secondary education upon arrival in Denmark. Covariates include age at application, gender, partner, number of
children, education level and dummies for the most common nationalities (Afghanistan, Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Somalia). In Denmark 2015 is a dummy
equal to one if the individual is registered in Denmark year 2015. Criminal conviction is a dummy equal to one if ever convicted of any crime. Property
crime is equal to one if ever convicted of a property crime. Giving birth is the number of times a family has more children. Hospital visits is the number of
doctor/hospital visits. *, ** and *** denotes significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
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G Long term outcomes
G.1 Quadratic polynomial fitted over time
Figure 12: Education outcomes
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H Balance of covariates
Table 5: Comparison of means for individuals residing in Denmark 2015 (bw 119 days)
(1) (2) (2)–(1)
Control Treatment Normalized difference
Demographic characteristics
Male 0.51 0.43 -0.16
(0.50) (0.50)
No. of children 1.78 1.66 -0.06
(1.91) (2.05)
Partner 0.53 0.57 0.08
(0.50) (0.50)
Age 30.92 31.65 0.08
(9.15) (9.73)
Education
Danish 1 0.23 0.25 0.05
(0.42) (0.43)
Danish 2 0.40 0.36 -0.08
(0.49) (0.48)
Danish 3 0.26 0.28 0.04
(0.44) (0.45)
Primary or secondary 0.48 0.47 -0.02
(0.50) (0.50)
Higher 0.23 0.23 0.00
(0.42) (0.42)
Country of origin
Afghanistan 0.37 0.33 -0.08
(0.48) (0.47)
Iraq 0.19 0.10 -0.26
(0.39) (0.30)
Former Yugoslavia 0.10 0.16 0.18
(0.30) (0.37)
Somalia 0.13 0.10 -0.09
(0.34) (0.30)
Other 0.21 0.31 0.23
(0.41) (0.47)
N 329 239
Notes: Values in parenthesis are (s.d.). This table show the means and normalized difference for individuals in
our sample that were still residing in Denmark in 2015. Demographic characteristics are measured at application.
Danish 1 - Danish 3 indicates the level of Danish courses assigned at approval, whereas primary or secondary
and higher education indicates the level of education acquired prior to applying for asylum in Denmark. The
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H.2 Outcomes at the cutoff for different bandwidths (incl. controls)
Figure 18: Education outcomes
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H.3 Outcomes over time
H.3.1 Regression discontinuity coefficients over time
Figure 21: Education and labor market outcomes
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H.3.2 Outcomes over time: heterogeneous effects





















1 3 5 7 9 11
Year relative to approval year
95% CI treat Mean treat





















1 3 5 7 9 11
Year relative to approval year
95% CI treat Mean treat





















1 3 5 7 9 11
Year relative to approval year
95% CI treat Mean treat





















1 3 5 7 9 11
Year relative to approval year
95% CI treat Mean treat
95% CI control Mean control
58
H.4 Test for manipulation of the running variable
H.4.1 Density test
Table 6: Regression Discontinuity Density test
bw 30 days bw 60 days bw 90 days bw 119 days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
p-value 0.017 0.623 0.363 0.009 0.200 0.077 0.121 0.935
Degree of polynomial 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Notes: Test is implemented using the rddensity command in Stata, using the robust bias-corrected estimates.
Reported values are p-values from this test.
H.4.2 Placebo tests
Table 7: Placebo test: Education outcomes
Outcome Left of the cutoff Right of the cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enrollment 0.298 0.279 0.042 -0.093
(0.187) (0.181) (0.208) (0.202)
Enrollment university 0.048 0.090 0.048 -0.066
(0.114) (0.112) (0.048) (0.064)
Covariates NO YES NO YES
Notes: Regressions are estimated for the full sample using a polynomial of order 1 and a uniform kernel. Covariates
include age, gender, partner, number of children, education level (all measured at application) and dummies for
the most common nationalities (Afghanistan, Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Somalia). We split the sample in two
halves at the cutoff. Then we run the regression on each sample using the median as cutoff.
Table 8: Placebo test: Labor market outcomes
Outcome Left of the cutoff Right of the cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employed -0.019 -0.090 0.211 0.874∗
(0.221) (0.201) (0.366) (0.451)
Earnings 3Y -9,993 -27,485 53,063 43,639
(78,314) (59,605) (41,749) (60,357)
Earnings 7Y 35,296 4,172 72,119 54,080
(85,831) (73,671) (65,266) (76,644)
Covariates NO YES NO YES
Notes: Regressions are estimated for the full sample using a polynomial of order 1 and a uniform kernel. Covariates
include age, gender, partner, number of children, education level (all measured at application) and dummies for
the most common nationalities (Afghanistan, Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Somalia). We split the sample in two
halves at the cutoff. Then we run the regression on each sample using the median as cutoff.
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Table 9: Placebo test: Crime, Fertility behavior and Health
Outcome Left of the cutoff Right of the cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In Denmark 2015 0.104 0.116 0.226 0.222∗
(0.101) (0.089) (0.146) (0.124)
Crime
Criminal conviction -0.214 -0.209 0.271 -0.002
(0.200) (0.194) (0.203) (0.217)
Property crime -0.144 -0.064 0.163 0.147
(0.168) (0.147) (0.194) (0.168)
Fertility behavior
Giving birth -0.575 -0.295 -1.803∗∗ 1.881∗∗∗
(0.687) (0.669) (0.891) (0.664)
Health status
Hospital visits -2.654 -5.605 -1.059 -16.570∗∗
(7.311) (5.629) (5.799) (7.757)
Covariates NO YES NO YES
Notes: Regressions are estimated for the full sample using a polynomial of order 1 and a uniform kernel. Covariates
include age, gender, partner, number of children, education level (all measured at application) and dummies for
the most common nationalities (Afghanistan, Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Somalia). We split the sample in two
halves at the cutoff. Then we run the regression on each sample using the median as cutoff.
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H.5 Mapping from DISCO codes to skill levels
We use the Danish version of the International Standard Classifications of Occupations (DISCO) to
map working functions, that we observe in the data, into different skill levels. We define skill level
by picking one occupation per year and person. If a person has more than one job, we take the job
with the highest skill level. If there is more than one job with the same skill level, we pick the most
common job within that skill level. Finally, if a person has two jobs from different occupations
that have the same skill level in a given year, we pick the occupation with the highest ranking
according to the DISCO code. If a person has equally many jobs in two occupations with the same
skill level and one of the occupations is in the armed forces, we pick the civilian occupation as the
main occupation. This variable is used to see if there is a change in average skill level over time.
Code Description Skill level
1 Managers 3 + 4a
2 Professionals 4
3 Technicians and Associate Professionals 3
4 Clerical Support Workers 2
5 Services and Sales Workers 2
6 Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Workers 2
7 Craft and Related Trades Workers 2
8 Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers 2
9 Elementary Occupations 1
0 Armed Forces Occupations 1, 2 + 4b
aLevel 3 for managers in Hospitality, Retail and Service. Other managers have skill level 4.
bMilitary officers are level 4, other occupations are at level 1. Non-commissioned Officers count as skill level 2.
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